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Understanding Pramāṇa

In the grand tapestry of Indian philosophy, one question echoes through millennia: How do we truly know? This fundamental inquiry into the nature of knowledge and its sources forms the bedrock of all philosophical discourse in the Indian tradition.

In Sanskrit, the valid knowledge is called Pramā, the knower of the valid knowledge is called Pramātā, and the means by which it is validly known is called Pramāṇa.

Why the Obsession with Pramāṇa Discussion?

What is the obsession over discussion of pramāṇa in different darśanas under the umbrella of Hinduism or the derivatives of Hinduism such as Buddhism and Jainism?

It is due to the recognition that cognition itself can be flawed, that beliefs are not absolute and can be wrong or right. This is not done after the creation of organized religions to keep itself up-to-date and make itself appear more logical, but this discussion was always a crucial part of the system. It comes from the understanding of the fact that "If Pramāṇa is proper then Pramā will be proper".

Pūrva-pakṣa: Truth (valid knowledge) is the notion of existence applied to something that exists and that of non-existence with respect to something that doesn't exist. How could something non-existent be cognized through the source of knowledge?

Uttara-pakṣa: Something existent is known through a knowledge source, something not grasped is simply known to be non-existent.

What is the Lakṣaṇa of Pramāṇa?

Nyāya states:

"pramā-karaṇam pramāṇam" - प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणम् ।

Pramāṇa is the cause of pramā (valid knowledge). It is seen as the source of valid knowledge.

Pramāṇa is mostly equated with epistemology, it may give the similar vibe but it would be injustice to equate both of them, as it is rightly said:

"In Indian philosophy, epistemology (pramāṇa-śāstra) does not begin with the definition of knowledge as in the West; rather, it begins with an analysis of the means of knowledge. The Indian question is not 'What is knowledge?' but 'How do we know?'"
— B.K. Matilal (Oxford professor, trained in both Nyāya and analytic philosophy): Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge, 1986.

So Pramāṇa is the source of pramā (valid knowledge) [except in Buddhism where it is equated with pramā].

The Complete List of Pramāṇas

According to SJG (Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī), there are a total of ten pramāṇas which he listed in his sarva-saṃvādinī commentary:

1. Pratyakṣa (Perception) - Tāntrikas, Paurānikas, Mīmāṃsakāras, Naiyāyikas, Sāṅkhya & Yoga, Buddhist, Vaiśeṣika, Cārvākas
2. Anumāna (Inference) - Tāntrikas, Paurānikas, Mīmāṃsakāras, Naiyāyikas, Sāṅkhya & Yoga, Buddhist, Vaiśeṣika
3. Śabda (Revealed sound knowledge) - Tāntrikas, Paurānikas, Mīmāṃsakāras, Naiyāyikas, Sāṅkhya & Yoga
4. Ārṣa (Statements of the sages)
5. Upamāna (Comparison) - Tāntrikas, Paurānikas, Mīmāṃsakāras, Naiyāyikas
6. Arthāpatti (Presumption) - Tāntrikas, Paurānikas, Mīmāṃsakāras
7. Anupalabdhi (Non-cognition of being) - Tāntrikas, Paurānikas, Mīmāṃsakāras (Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, a sect of Mīmāṃsakāras) [Advaita Vedāntins also]
8. Sambhava (Inclusion) - Tāntrikas, Paurānikas
9. Aitihya (Tradition) - Tāntrikas
10. Ceṣṭā (Gesture) - Tāntrikas

Different Darśanas and Their Primary Pramāṇas

In fact, the different darśanas under the umbrella of Hinduism have different pramāṇa as their topmost pramāṇa and the ontology is discussed with the help of exposition from that pramāṇa. For example:

• Sāṅkhya is anumāna-pramāṇa-pradhāna (Primarily inference-based)
• Pūrva-mīmāṃsā & Uttara-mīmāṃsā is śabda-pramāṇa-pradhāna (Primarily scripture-based)
• Cārvākas is pratyakṣa-pramāṇa-pradhāna (Primarily perception-based)

So the difference between the darśanas arises from the question "What is the primary pramāṇa?" That's why they have differences in their approach and understanding of reality.

SJG's Classification System

SJG accepts all ten pramāṇas, but he subsumes them into 3 categories:

• Comparison, presumption, inclusion and gesture are varieties of anumāna
• Non-cognition of being is a kind of pratyakṣa
• Ārṣa & aitihya are types of śabda-pramāṇa

[This study is detailed in Tattva-sandarbha commentary of Śrī Satyanarayana Babaji Maharaj]

Among the 10, the 3 primary ones are accepted by many darśanas and hence these 3 will be highly discussed here, while the rest of 7 will be explained in a subsequent blog.

The Meta-Question: How Do We Validate Our Means of Knowledge?

One of the most profound and frequently debated questions in Indian epistemology emerges once we accept that pramāṇas give us valid knowledge: How do we know that our pramāṇas themselves are reliable?

Two Fundamental Positions

The Indian philosophical tradition has developed two primary responses to this challenge:

Svataḥ-prāmāṇya (Self-Validity of Knowledge)

"Knowledge validates itself"

Parataḥ-prāmāṇya (External Validity of Knowledge)

"Knowledge requires external validation"

Position 1: Svataḥ-prāmāṇya - The Self-Validating Nature of Knowledge

According to the first position, advocated primarily by the Mīmāṃsakas:

"Knowledge does not need to prove its validity; rather, what needs proof is its invalidity."

The Infinite Regress Argument (Anavasthā-doṣa)

The Mīmāṃsakas present a compelling logical argument: If every piece of knowledge needs external validation, then:

• Knowledge A requires Knowledge B to validate it
• Knowledge B requires Knowledge C to validate it
• Knowledge C requires Knowledge D... and so on infinitely

This leads to an infinite regress where no knowledge can ever be established as valid. Therefore, knowledge must be self-validating to avoid this logical trap.

When you see a tree, do you:

First see the tree Then use another perception to validate that the first perception was valid?

Obviously not! The knowledge comes with its own sense of validity. The validation is built into the knowledge itself.

Empirical Evidence from Daily Life

Consider your everyday experience: When you see your friend approaching, you don't think, "Now let me verify whether this perception of my friend is valid." You immediately and naturally accept it as valid knowledge. This immediate acceptance demonstrates the self-evident nature of valid knowledge.

The Burden of Proof Principle

Since knowledge is naturally valid, the burden of proof lies on establishing invalidity, not validity. Only when specific defects (doṣa) are present, such as:

• Defective sense organs
• Poor environmental conditions
• Mental disturbance
• Contradictory evidence

— should we question the validity of our knowledge.

Note :- This position is taken with the understanding that if one denies intrinsic validity, it seems hard to defend sabda as inherently authoritative.

Position 2: Parataḥ-prāmāṇya - External Validation of Knowledge

The second position maintains that knowledge requires external validation is usually taken up by nyaya.

The Three-Fold Validation Process

Knowledge is validated through:

1. Practical Success (Pravṛtti-sāmarthya): Valid knowledge leads to successful action. If I correctly perceive water and can quench my thirst, the knowledge is validated.

2. Non-contradiction (Avirodha): Valid knowledge doesn't contradict other established knowledge. Inference must not contradict perception, and various perceptions must cohere.

3. Expert Testimony (Āpta-vacana): Reliable authorities can confirm or refute our knowledge claims.

According to this view:

• Perceptual knowledge is validated by successful practical activity
• Inferential knowledge is validated by non-contradiction with perception
• Verbal knowledge is validated by reliability of the source

If validity were truly intrinsic, then illusions—such as mistaking silver for nacre—would also initially appear valid. This raises an important objection:

Objection: Nyāya asserts that pramāṇa is the source of pramā (valid knowledge). How, then, can it generate wrong knowledge?

Reply: The real question is whether the source was a genuine pramāṇa or merely an imitator. The issue is not whether pramāṇa can be right or wrong, but whether the cognition arose from a properly functioning pramāṇa.

For Nyāya, pramāṇa is defined as “an instrument capable of generating valid cognition when properly functioning,” not as “guaranteed validity in every instance.” Thus, there is no contradiction in acknowledging the possibility of error.

Nyāya insists on parataḥ-prāmāṇya (external validation) to avoid the problem that illusions would appear valid under svataḥ-prāmāṇya at first instance. This stance is rooted in their commitment to realism and the necessity of an external check on truth.

Nyāya’s Response to the Circularity Objection

Nyāya addresses the circularity objection by distinguishing between:

1. Primary cognition (e.g., “This is water”)
2. Subsequent awareness of validity (“Yes, this was indeed valid knowledge, since I quenched my thirst”)

The act of knowing and the awareness of its validity are separate processes. This separation allows for external validation without falling into circular reasoning, as outlined in their approach above.

Conclusion :- In both svataḥ-prāmāṇya (Mīmāṃsā / Vedānta) and parataḥ-prāmāṇya (Nyāya), the pramāṇa itself really does generate valid cognition (yathārtha-jñāna) when it is working properly.

Note:

The Unavoidable Use of Pramāṇas

Anyone raising the circularity objection is already relying on pramāṇas:

• Trusting their reasoning (buddhi-pramāṇa)
• Assuming words convey meaning (śabda-pramāṇa)
• Believing their logic is sound (anumāna-pramāṇa)
• Expecting others to understand (all pramāṇas)

"Your very ability to raise the circularity objection demonstrates that you already accept the self-validating nature of knowledge. You cannot coherently deny what you must assume to make your denial."

In summary:
To doubt pramāṇas, you must already use them—your objection is its own defeat.

The Emerging Question

This analysis leads us to a new question:

"Given that pramāṇas must be inherently reliable to deserve the name, what are the conditions under which this inherent reliability manifests?"

Additionally, several intriguing questions arise that will be explored in future posts:

• Which pramāṇa has ultimate authority when they conflict?
• Do pramāṇas provide knowledge about the past, present, and future equally, or are their domains distinct?
• What determines whether something is knowable or unknowable?
• What are imitators of pramāṇa? (According to nyaya)

Stay tuned—these topics will be addressed in upcoming blogs.

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What's Next?

In our next exploration, we will delve deeper into Pratyakṣa (perception), the first and most immediate of the pramāṇas. We will examine its various types, conditions for validity, and its role in establishing our understanding of reality.

Read the next post: Pramāṇa - 02: Pratyakṣa (Perception)

Recommended Reading

To deepen your understanding of Pramāṇa and Indian epistemology, consider exploring the following texts:

• Tattva Sandarbha by Śrī Satyanarayana Babaji Maharaj
• Nyāya Sūtra
• Ślokavārttika

These works offer valuable insights into the foundational concepts discussed in this series.

This series on Pramāṇa aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of Indian epistemology as it forms the foundation for all philosophical inquiry in our tradition.